Monday, November 2, 2009

Nikah Misyar or Travellers marriage (temporary Marriage)

Discussion on Nikah Misyar or Travellers marriage (temporary Marriage) at Point Blank – 29th September 2009 with Mubashir Luqman on Express News.
Participants: Alama Abdul jalil Naqvi, Hafiz Tahir and Rafay Alam with Mubashir Luqman.



Choraha – 31st October 2009

Hassan Nassar brings a fresh episode of Choraha and discusses current issues with Gazi Salah-ud-Din, Shahid Kardar, Ameer Al Azeem and Rafaqat Ali Khan.

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

Police sacrilege Ahmadiyya Mosque and houses in Lathianwala

Faisalabad, Pakistan; Aug 10, 2009: Couple of days ago a case under anti-Ahmadiyya clauses (PPC 298) was registered by some activists of Sunni Tehreek against 32 Ahmadis accusing them of inscribing Holy scriptures at their houses and place of worship which allegedly hurt the feelings of complainants in village Lathianwala located some 25KM away from Faisalabad at Sheikhupura Road. Police at the behest of some bigots also added Blasphemy clause PPC 295-C (Use of derogatory remarks, etc; in respect of the Holy Prophet) to the FIR (First Information Report) which carries death penalty. At this outrageous act of Police a three member delegation of Ahmadis approached high ranking police officials to get the Blasphemy charges dropped and settle the matter peacefully without unjustifiably hurting innocent Ahmadis implicated in the case.

In the morning of August 10, 2009 around 300 strong contingent of Police, gathered from whole district, stormed the Mosque and 28 houses belonging to Ahmadiyya Muslim Community and removed Holy inscriptions, comprising Names of Allah and Kalima (Muslim creed) etc. According to reliable sources the terror and frightful operation continued for 8 hours. Police sacrilege was led by Deputy Superintendent of Police Rai Muhammad Hussain and Station House Officer Mian Muuneer Ahmed of Police Station Khururianwala while the matter was still pending decision with high ranking police official Senior Superintendent of Police Kamran Yousuf. At the time of operation Ahmadiyya delegation was waiting for a meeting with Deputy Inspector General of Police.

Police used chisels, cement, paint etc to do this dreadful act of shameful sacrilege and removed every Arabic word they could find on Ahmadiyya Mosque and houses. It is worth noting that media was kept at distance thereby not allowing to cover this act. After what happened at Gojra and Mureedke last week; Police is still busy to appease the religious extremists and bigots. Religious minorities feel insecure and helpless in this hostile environment.



32 innocent Ahmadis still face the charges of anti-Ahmadiyya laws and Blasphemy, arrests and prosecution which may lead to from three years imprisonment to death.

Sunday, August 16, 2009

Hamas Crushes Islamist Group in Gaza

Some 22 militants died in fighting in Gaza between Hamas and the Army of God's Helpers on Friday, the latter being a radical fundamentalist cult that took some of its cues from al-Qaeda and the Taliban and demanded the imposition of a rigid understanding of Islamic law in Gaza, as well as plotting global holy war. Hamas, though it is fundamentalist, is more of a regional political party and less of a cult, and it has a strict policy against hitting the US or other international targets beyond Israel itself. Hamas is focused on Palestinian-Israeli issues, not on global jihad. Hamas won the 2006 parliamentary elections in both Gaza and the West Bank and so is the legitimate government of both, but it was removed from the West Bank when it clashed with the secular Palestine Liberation Organization of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Aljazeera English reports on the fighting:



It appears to me that Hamas was earlier made by Western media and politicians to take the blame for things that the Army of the Helpers of God actually did.

As for why some people at a mosque in Rafah turned to this extremist organization, it has to be remembered that Gaza is under siege by the Israelis and faces shortages, including of food. Rebuilding from Israel's war on little Gaza has still not been allowed to begin. The Israelis have only allowed in what is need for basic survival, as is pointed out in the below film from Dissident Voice.

Gaza Under Siege from Lily Keber on Vimeo.



Israeli policies are what have turned Gaza into a powder keg. And we haven't heard the last of al-Qaeda-type organizations growing up there if the Israeli siege continues.

Thursday, August 13, 2009

Remembering Nazia Hassan


Nazia Hassan was hailed as the queen of pop music in South Asia during the 1980's. — White Star

KARACHI: Thursday marks the death anniversary of Pakistani musician Nazia Hassan, a pop icon who endeared herself to millions across the Indian subcontinent.

Nazia Hassan was one the most popular and influential female singers in South Asia during the 1980’s, and is regarded as a pioneer of Western-style pop music in the region.

Nazia burst on to the scene when she provided vocals for the song ‘Aap Jaisa Koi’ in the Bollywood film Qurbani in 1980, making her hugely popular across India.

She then collaborated with UK-based Indian music producer Biddu, who was then relatively unknown, to produce the album Disco Deewaney in 1981. The album was a huge success, breaking sales records in Pakistan and receiving considerable international acclaim.


 




She subsequently worked with her brother, Zohaib Hassan, to release four more albums: Star/Boom Boom (1982), Young Tarang (1984), Hotline (1987) and Camera Camera (1992).

The brother-sister duo also made numerous appearances on Pakistan Television (PTV) throughout the 1980s, and jointly hosted the show Music’89.

She was one the first South Asian performers to perform disco-inspired dance music, helping to shake up the then-moribund popular music scene. The new music and attitude that the London-educated singer is credited with paving the path for popular 1990s acts such as the Vital Signs and the Jupiters.

Following the release of her last album Nazia shifted her focus to philanthropic work abroad, and also worked for the United Nations.

The shining light that was Nazia Hassan died in August 13, 2000 in London after a prolonged battle with lung cancer at the young age of 35.

Source: Dawn News

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Spike in Bombings in Iraq Unrelated to lack of US Patrols

Bombings killed 8 and wounded 50 in Iraq on Tuesday. There were two bombings in eastern Shiite neighborhoods in the capital. A boy and two soldiers were wounded near Baqubah.

These attacks are likely to go on for a while. But despite what a lot of commentators imply, the recent bombings have almost nothing to do with the cessation of US patrols in the major cities.

As AFP lets slip, 437 Iraqis were killed by political violence in June, the last month of US military patrols, with 40 attacks per week.

In July, the first month in which there were no regular US patrols in the major cities, 275 Iraqis were killed in political violence and the number of attacks was 29 per week.

One month does not make a trend. The number of deaths in August could well be back up to the June level. But if deaths and attacks dropped by a third during the first month of no US patrols, it is not legitimate to suggest that the patrols need to start back up or their lack is the cause of increased violence!

Moreover, the bombing in Khazna north of Mosul would not have been in any way impeded by patrols of US troops in the big city of Mosul. Small villages have all along been vulnerable to attacks precisely because they are seldom garrisoned by US or Iraqi troops. In August of 2007, truck bombings of two Yazidi villages in the north killed an estimated 500 Iraqis. And that was at the height of the so-called 'surge.' US troops could not stop the hitting of a soft target like that 2 years ago, and Iraqi troops cannot stop it today. It is irrelevant to the question of the security fallout from the US withdrawal.

So, to repeat: Violence and monthly death tolls fell when the US troops stopped patrolling. And attacks like that at Khazna were happening when US troops had more security duties.

So whatever has been going on in Iraq during the past week is not an argument for the unwisdom of the troop drawdown. The journalists who are playing up this angle are just not doing the math.

Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Taliban Briefly Take Logar Capital Near Kabul;
12 Taliban Killed in Clashes, bombings;
Taliban Warn against Voting

Shabakah-'i Ittila-Rasani-yi Afghanistan reports in Persian that on Monday, a squad of Taliban briefly took over the main government buildings in Pul-i Alam, the capital of Logar Province just south of Kabul (about 31 miles away). They began with a suicide bombing. Then they fired rocket propelled grenades and rushed the offices of the mayor, the police chief and the electoral commission, according to Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid. Afghan News.net says that Afghan army and US/NATO troops rushed to the city and took back the government offices in hard fighting that left 2 Afghan soldiers dead and 4 Taliban. Reuters reporters The Persian source above claimed much higher casualties, and alleged that the governor and his deputy had been wounded. (More details in English are here.)

For 12 or so fighters to occupy government offices in the capital of the province abutting Kabul directly to its south on the eve of a presidential election is sort of like al-Qaeda taking over Richmond, Virginia in late October in an election year. The guerrillas could only have succeeded because the Pul-i Alam police and military faded away rather than fight them. Only Afghan army and ISAF units from the capital were able to dislodge the guerrillas.

Logar province is about 60 percent Pashtun and has large Tajik (Sunni) and Hazara (Shiite) minorities as well. It is the birthplace of presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani. During the Soviet period it was called "the Gate of Jihad" because it was on the route from Pakistan north to Kabul traversed by mujahidin such as Gulbadin Hikmatyar (once the CIA's favorite holy warrior but now the leader of a militant group attacking the US and the Kabul government).

I take it that it is this sort of thing that impelled Gen. Stanley McChrystal to say that the Taliban are growing in power (even if he did not say that they are getting the upper hand, as he now maintains.)

Meanwhile, airstrikes and clashes between US/NATO troops and guerrillas in southern Afghanistan killed 12 on Monday.

And the WSJ reports that the US and the Kabul government are recruiting tribal levies to fight Taliban and to safeguard polling stations in the August 20 elections.

I'm not sure most Afghan tribesmen are sufficiently non-partisan that they would make good guards of ballot boxes.

The USG Open Source Center translates from a jihadi web site the demand by "the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," i.e. the Taliban, that Afghans boycott the coming election (Sawt al-Jihad, p. 9, Aug. 9, 2009):

' . . . the Afghans and all the people of the world know that any election or step that is carried out under the occupation and by the orders of America and its allies will have no good consequences for the Afghan people and their interests. The election will not produce any government acceptable to the Afghans, and will not appoint anyone who will work for the benefit and interest of Afghanistan and its people.

"The Afghan people have experienced before the procedures and the transparency of the election of Kabul's agent administration that was held four years ago. The votes of 30 million people were changed and replaced by the votes of a few people by force, and by methods involving cheating and deceiving which were approved by America. As a result of this past election, a corrupt regime and administration came into power and worked as a spy for the US forces. Due to this agent government, thousands of innocent civilians were killed and tortured, Afghan villages and houses were bombarded, prisons were filled with people, Islamic principles and Afghan traditions were insulted, poverty increased, corruption spread, the occupying forces came to Afghanistan, and all methods were used to deceive and destroy the next Afghan generation, and so it goes on...

"Now America is throwing dust in the eyes of the Afghans as it did before. Again it is trying to put its trained agents into power to rule the Afghan people, and to put the Afghans in a whirlpool of deception and trouble for more years!!

"As the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan-Taliban considers the serial of the so-called presidential election an insult and subjugation of religious and traditional Afghan principles, we call on the Afghan people not to expect from this anti Islamic US project any good for them, their country, or their beliefs.

"The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan-Taliban urges the Afghan people to confront this US project as much as they can, prevent their families and relatives from participating, not support the infidelity and corruption with their votes, and not go to the election centers, which will be the target of mujahidin strikes.'


Aljazeera English has video on how the Taliban are targeting the elections:



Richard Engels reports from Kabul via Chris Matthews' Hardball on MSNBC that Gen. Stanley McChrystal maintains he was misquoted on Monday by the Wall Street Journal when it attributed to him the sentiment that the Taliban were gaining the upper hand. Engels says that eliminating the Taliban, an indigenous Pashtun movement, is impossible. He says the US commanders still hope to at least be able to pacify them.



Monday, August 10, 2009

Taliban,British Gen

McChrystal: Taliban Have Upper Hand;
Violence, Corruption Threaten Election;
British Gen. Pledges 40 Years in Afghanistan


Gen. Stanley McChrystal, head of US forces in Afghanistan, admitted in an interview with the Wall Street Journal on Monday that the Taliban have gained the upper hand in fighting in Afghanistan. They are deploying small units that combine suicide bombings and ambushes, killing US troops at an unprecedented rate. McChrystal wants an addition 10,000 troops, with which to garrison the major western Pashtun city of Qandahar, a center of the Taliban insurgency.

McChrystal said that he only had about a year to turn things around in Afghanistan if the effort was not to lose the support of the US public. My own impression from lecturing around the country is that the American public is tired of wars, doesn't see the point of the current ones, can't any longer connect them to their security, and in view of the collapse of the economy thinks that there are better uses for the $4 bn. a month that the Afghanistan effort is costing. 54% of Americans now oppose the Afghanistan war, a big drop from May, according to a CNN poll. The Helmand operation in July, which caused casualties to spike, and awoke the public to the fact that there is a war, was probably implicated in its declining popularity. Some 58% of Britons in a recent poll said that the war is unwinnable. The likelihood is that a year is too short a time for the US military and NATO to turn the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan around, and that the fight for public opinion is likely to be lost well before that happens.

Last week, seven US and British troops were killed in a 24-hour period in Afghanistan. July was the bloodiest month of the war so far. Nearly 700 US troops have been killed in the Afghanistan operation since 2001.

Gen. James L. Jones, the National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, said Sunday that the US would not be in Afghanistan for "ten years" as Australian security analyst David Kilcullen, now a staffer for Gen. McChrystal in Afghanistan, had suggested. Jones said that the US now had a new strategy in that country, which consisted of:

1. More security

2. economic development

3. better local governance

Jones denied that he had ruled out a further increase of US troops in Afghanistan.

The National Security Adviser said that the killing of Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mahsud was 'not a turning point' but was good news for the war effort. The Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan, of whom Mahsud was a leader, give support to the Afghan Taliban just across the border. (Transcript at Real Clear Politics

The United Nations warns that an uptick in violence threatens citizens' ability to participate in the upcoming presidential campaign. The province of Ghazni in the Pashtun south is so beset with guerrilla violence that candidates cannot campaign (shades of Iraq in 2005!) There are also allegations of stolen ballot forms intended to be deployed to steal the vote in some districts.

The Afghan newspaper Hasht Sobh reports in Dari Persian that a candidate for the provincial council of the northern province of Juzjan was robbed and briefly held hostage by Taliban while out campaigning. Juzjan is in the north of the country, which is generally quieter than the Pashtun south. But there are a few Taliban even in the north, and the ones in Kunduz again wounded a German soldier on Sunday.

The UN mission in Afghanistan also complains that the government of incumbent President Hamid Karzai is deploying state resources to swing the election to him. Other candidates haven't been able to get on national television, and government trucks have been used for pro-Karzai campaigning.

International journalists in Afghanistan are frustrated, suspecting that the Afghan government has given orders to local officials to downplay guerrilla attacks and bombings and to give them a partial accounts from a heavily pro-government point of view. The allegation implies that these steps have been taken in order to cut down on bad press in advance of the August 20 presidential election.

In contrast to UN worries about security, the Dari Persian newspaper Hasht Sobh reports from Kabul that Gen. Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, was pledging that if you counted police, Afghan army forces, and US and NATO troops, the forces providing security for the August 20 presidential elections are 300,000 strong. He said that in warfare you can only typically commit one-third of your forces to actual fighting, but in peace-keeping you can deploy 100%. While this is technically perhaps true, in fact local police in Afghanistan are not for the most part up taking on the Taliban, even at checkpoints. The Afghan army is still poorly trained, relatively small, and lacks esprit de corps (there are also ethnic problems in its deployment). Most NATO forces are in the peaceful north and would be reluctant to come south where the fighting is. So if the question is whether campaigning and voting are safe in places in the Pashtun south like Qandahar and Ghazni, the answer is no.

Any plans by the US and NATO to negotiate with the Taliban have had to be postponed, since Taliban leaders have forbidden Afghans to vote and have threatened violence against polling stations.

Incoming head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards, is under fire from Labour Party cabinet ministers and by Tory and Lib-Dem politicians for his recent statement that Britain would be in Afghanistan for forty years . (He needs to have a trans-Atlantic talk with Gen. Jones.) To be fair, Gen. Richards appears to have been thinking of a long term nation-building effort rather than prolonged war-fighting, but the British public and much of its military is suffering from war fatigue, having lost hundreds of men in Iraq and Afghanistan for reasons that Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown have never successfully articulated or in some cases for reasons that were patently false (as with Blair's breathless announcement that Saddam could have hit Europe with WMD-tipped missiles within 45 minutes of giving the order.) Richards appears to feel that the British role in Basra, Iraq, was less successful than it could have been because the military became isolated from the Iraqis and the UK did not attempt nation-building efforts on a large scale in the Shiite south where its soldiers were patrolling.

Gen. Richards distinguished himself earlier in the decade in Afghanistan, where he cultivated Pashtun elders and negotiated with the Taliban, avoiding the American tactics of massive firepower and resort to special operations forces. You can only imagine what then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld thought of Gen. Richards. The British officer, born in Cairo into a military family, is an old Middle East hand of a sort lacking or sidelined in the United States until recently.

ITN has video of the "forty years" controversy:



The USG Open Source Center translated the response of the Afghan Taliban to Gen. Richards' comments, which appeared in the Pashto-language Afghan Islamic Press on Saturday August 8, 2009, under the headline, "Taleban criticize UK general's statement on Afghan operation." Taliban commanders said that Richards was revealing the real scheme of the Western imperialists, which was a perpetual occupation of Afghanistan. And they turned the remark against the Karzai government, pointing out that it had never set a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces:

'Considering the remarks by the incoming British head of the army as the real voice and intention of the British government, the Taleban Spokesman Qari Yosuf Ahmadi has told AIP: It is the fact that the Britons and other foreign countries are here to occupy this country, the statements by the incoming British chief of the general staff are the main voice and intention of all the Britons, in the one hand hopefully by the passage of every day the Britons and other foreigners are speaking about their intentions and on the other hand, we believe that the foreign invaders will never be able to occupy Afghanistan."

Considering the statements by the incoming British chief of general staff as the long term intention for occupation, another Taleban spokesman Zabihollah Mojahed has told AIP: The Britons will never achieve their objective, the father of General David Richards has also died in this hope to capture Afghanistan, but no doubt that no one can occupy and colonize Afghanistan due to the Afghans' Jehad and resistance. He has criticized the Afghan government and said that the Britons intend to stay in Afghanistan for 40 years, but so far the government and the parliament have not been able to set up timetable for the pullout of the foreigners, the latest statements by the incoming UK head of army indicates that the British forces would be involved for more than 40 years in Afghanistan.'


Whatever Gen. Richards' intent, his remarks had the effect in Afghanistan of raising nationalist hackles and so were unwise, insofar as they gave the Taliban a propaganda victory.

Wednesday, August 5, 2009

Reformists Boycott Ahmadinejad's Inauguration

Even the official Iranian site Press TV had to admit that of 70 reformist members of parliament, only 13 attended Ahmadinejad's inauguration.

AP has more on Wednesday's protests.

Opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi called Wednesday for the regime to permit continued demonstrations by the reform faction. Freedom of assembly is guaranteed in the Iranian constitution. (But then it is in the US constitution, too, which didn't stop Bush from setting up 'protest zones' on the model of contemporary Egypt).

Aljazeera English now has video of the swearing in speech.





Sunday, July 26, 2009

Afghanistan See Attacks Rise on Eve of Election

Update: Taliban in Kunduz in Afghanistan's north attempted to assassinate warlord Muhammad Qasim Fahim on Sunday, but failed. One of his bodyguards was wounded in the attack. There are few Taliban in the north, but there are some Pashtuns in Kunduz and some of them have been radicalized. The violence underscores how perilous the security situation is in the run-up to the election, as below.

Afghanistan is on edge ahead of the August 20 presidential elections, given the uptick in Taliban violence in the Pashtun areas. On Saturday, a team of 7 Taliban wearing bomb vests attacked a bank and a police station in Khost, near the Pakistan border. Afghan official sources said that all 7 were killed, but the NYT says residents told it that they could still hear gun battles late Saturday in the city.

There was also significant violence last Tuesday. In fact, July seen the most bloodshed in Afghanistan since 2002. A British soldier was killed on Saturday, bringing the UK death statistics for its troops in Afghanistan to 20 so far in July.

Aljazeera English has video:



Incumbent President Hamid Karzai is putting pressure on the some 90,000 US and NATO troops in his country, pledging to seek a formal agreement about when and under what circumstances the foreign troops can deploy violence in Afghanistan.



The US military lacks enough good translators of Pashto into English, and is contracting out the work of finding them, not always with success. You know, if the Bush administration had just started training a few thousand US military personnel in Pashto in 2001 when it was clear that the US was going into Afghanistan, we wouldn't be in such a bind. But somehow I don't think the previous administration was all that interested in a resource-poor, petroleum-free region.

The USG Open Source Center translates a discussion on Iranian radio with an Afghan critic of President Karzai, who complained about Karzai's decision to skip the presidential debate held recently:

' Afghan Observer Says TV Debate Lost Attraction Without Karzai
Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran External Service
Saturday, July 25, 2009
Document Type: OSC Translated Text. . .

(Presenter) The first TV debate in history of the newly-born democratic Afghanistan took place on 23 July. The hotly awaited TV debate which was broadcast on the two television stations and one radio station which private Tolo Television owns was supposed to be held among prominent presidential candidates Hamed Karzai, Dr Abdullah Abdullah and Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. But President Hamed Karzai declined an invitation for the debate and as a result a podium for him was left empty in the centre of the television studio.

Dr Abdullah, a former foreign minister, and Dr Ghani, a former finance minister, two of the leading challengers for the presidency, comfortably answered questions in the two main languages of Afghanistan, Dari and Pashto. It was not serious debate more or less looked like interview and briefings of the candidates on various policies, including national integrity, security, economy, education, foreign policy and social and political structures.

Not only Afghans but the people all around the world who follow up the Afghan situation closely were keen to see Hamed Karzai in front of the two other major candidates who had challenged him. According to Afghan politicians Hamed Karzai did not show up in the debate merely because he could not provide satisfactory responses to all the questions by his rivals. Speaking on the issue, Afghan observer Assil Noori says Karzai's failure to attend the TV debate was not happy news for millions of Afghans and even his supporter.

(Noori) There is no doubt that the TV debate was supposed to be one of the major events in history of a country like Afghanistan. However, absence of Mr Karzai reduced the value and significance of the debate. In fact, the debate lost its attraction without Mr Karzai and everyone was expecting Mr Karzai to be there to defend his policies and to provide responses to the questions and criticism of his rivals. However, his failure to attend the debate caused a situation of dismay even among his supporters. In general it was a useful and it was a good start for more debates and we hope to see Mr Karzai in the upcoming debates by the mass media.



Friday, July 24, 2009

Baghdad Furious over Secret US contact with Guerrillas;

the US military presence in Iraq is highly unlikely to completely end at the close of 2011. the important thing is that the combat troops will be out and that the tiny number who remain will mainly be trainers of Iraqi troops; there will likely continue to be some Air Force personnel, since the US will be Iraq's Air Force until about 2018 at least.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said as much in Washington on Thursday. Aljazeera English has video:



The headlines this admission generated in US news sources about 'US troops may stay' are a little puzzling to me, and seem actually sensational. What al-Maliki explicitly said was that Iraq may ask for a handful of trainers to stay. He is not saying that the US military will be rolling tanks in Iraqi cities in 2012.

Of course, it is possible that the Sadrists and the Sunni Arabs will ally to force all US troops out on the short timetable. Both could strengthen their positions in parliament in the January 2010 elections, and they may be able to appeal to Iraqi nationalism to get a resolution through forbidding the sort of thing of which al-Maliki spoke.

It is also possible that the Obama administration just won't be interested in a further US military presence in Iraq, what with having Afghanistan on its plate, which is quite enough.

In case the nationalist Iraqi forces did forestall al-Maliki or his successor from such a step, the training would just shift offshore, maybe to Jordan (where a lot of Iraqi officers and police have been trained anyway in recent years). And the US Air Force support for Iraqi troops who get into trouble with local militias can be provided from air bases outside Iraq.

Either way, what al-Maliki said is not a story.

What is a story is the revelation that US officials met in Turkey this spring twice with representatives of an umbrella group of Sunni Arab guerrillas from Iraq. The guerrillas were disappointed that a third meeting was not held and so leaked the news of the first two. They appear to think that Iran ordered al-Maliki to order the US to stay away from them.

Al-Maliki would not have needed any orders from Tehran. He has steadfastly resisted American requests that he reach out to the Sunni Arab guerrillas himself. He dismisses them as Baathists and murderers. The Iraqi government is asking the US sharp questions about why they were having these meetings without informing Baghdad!

This sort of thing is the reason I suspect that al-Maliki won't actually be likely to ask, or be in a domestic position to ask, for US troops to remain in any numbers. In fact, he surely was sorry he was so accommodating to Washington during the visit, despite his desperate desire for US corporate investment in Iraq.

The USG Open Source Center translated a discussion of al-Maliki's visit on al-Alam TV (an Iranian channel broadcasting in Arabic) among a pro-Maliki Iraqi analyst, an anti-Maliki observer, and US Rep. Dennis Kucinich, which gives a sense of how furious Baghdad really is over the secret US talks with the guerrillas:

FYI -- Iranian Al-Alam TV Program Discusses Iraq, US Relations, Pacts
Al-Alam Television
Thursday, July 23, 2009
Document Type: OSC Summary . . .

Tehran Al-Alam TV in Arabic, in its "With the Event" program at 1735 GMT on 23 July . . . interviewed in the studio Jawad Talib, a political analyst; Hazim al-Shammari, an Iraqi academic, live from Baghdad; US Senator Dennis Kucinich, a congressman, live from Washington and Munir al-Ma'wi, a political analyst, live from Washington. . .

Central to the discussion was what was referred to in the program as a "bombshell" caused by news of a pact allegedly signed between the CIA and armed groups in Iraq. The program debated the significance of the such news and the implications on Iraqi-US relations, particularly the impact this has on the security pact between the two countries.

Talib defended Al-Maliki's government and said the CIA wanted to put pressure on Al-Maliki whilst on a visit to Washington. "They are twisting Maliki's arm," he said. It was completely inappropriate the way the news was made public, especially given Maliki's presence in Washington.

Al-Shammari agreed and said the alleged deal between the CIA and the armed groups was outside the security pact between the US and Iraq and that this was a "blow" to the new ties between the two countries. He said contacts between the armed groups and the US were known for a long time, but this was a new development. Shammari anticipated huge confusion to ensue as a result. Shammari also spoke of various "wings" within the US Administration, each pushing towards certain goals and each working in "secrecy". Concluding, he said this US Administration was not so different from the previous one.

Senator Kucinich said he was unaware of the alleged deal between the CIA and the armed groups. He said the US was sincere in its plans to pull out of Iraq.

Al-Ma'wi urged everyone to focus on the success of Maliki's visit, insisting that the news of the alleged deal was a side issue. He said he was confident that the US sought stability in Iraq and that whatever happens would fall within this context.

About removing Iraq from under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Kucinich said the US was trying to talk with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to resolve this matter. He said Iran too wanted reparations from Iraq. The programme moderator, in response to this last comment, said Iran was not against taking Iraq out of Chapter VII.

Talib said such news would surely undermine Maliki's visit. "If I were him (Maliki) I would have cut the visit short," said Talib. There is a security pact signed with a superpower, the ink of which is not yet dry, only for the CIA to come and make another pact with the armed groups. Talib asked: How is this possible?

Munir again said this was a side issue and the focus must be on the achievements of the visit. He disagreed with Talib about cutting the visit short and thought the suggestion to be irrational.

Al-Shammari said Maliki went to Washington to seek strength, but he would now return weakened. This would be a "triumph" for some Kurdish leaderships in Kurdistan. The US can actually order the removal of Chapter VII. They are not honest about this issue, Shammari said.

Talib disagreed and said Maliki did not go to Washington to seek strength. On the contrary, he said. Maliki gave the US clear signs that Iraq was becoming stronger and was capable of running its affairs. As for Chapter VII, the US wants to twist Maliki's arm. They want to tell Maliki that he has to achieve reconciliation in Iraq, including the Ba'thists. There are other regional powers who are seeking the return of the Ba'thists, said Talib. The other issue is the issue of Kirkuk. The US is playing a game, Talib said.

Munir said the US was seeking national reconciliation in Iraq. But that would entail the participation of the Ba'thists, said Munir. I agree, regional powers want the Ba'thists to return.

The "US Administration is not an angel. It is the biggest Satan," said Shammari, who anticipated an Iraqi-US conflict in the time to come.

The security pact between the US and Iraq was a cover-up for more serious issues, said Talib. Chapter VII is used as a card against Al-Maliki's government, he said. The US wants to keep the situation tense. They want to weaken Al-Maliki and they want to "abort" the next elections, said Talib.

(Description of Source: Tehran Al-Alam Television in Arabic -- IRIB's 24-hour Arabic news channel, targetting a pan-Arab audience)'



Al-Maliki also admitted that the Arab-Kurdish conflict over the future of Kirkuk province poses a particular danger to Iraq and needs to be resolved.

Al-Sharq al-Awsat reports in Arabic that al-Maliki said that he would resume negotiations with the Kurdish leadership after this weekend's elections in the Kurdistan Regional Government.

It is likely that incumbent Massoud Barzani will be returned as president, and he says he is not interested in negotations. He insists that there will be no compromise, and demands that the referendum in Kirkuk agreed-to in the Iraqi constitution be held. The United Nations has warned against holding the referendum on the grounds that it likely would kick off a civil war among Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen over Kirkuk.


Tuesday, July 21, 2009

Khamenei Warns Elite against Public Turmoil

Borzou Daragahi of the LAT explains that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned Monday that the opposition must cease its campaign of civil disobedience.


AP argues that the struggle in Iran has moved to a new stage, and is no longer just about street protests.
It is a now a struggle for power within the country's elite.

The USG Open Source Center translated Khamenei's speech. Here is the money graf:

' The people can only reach their goals in the light of security and tranquillity. If security is maintained, education, science, progress, industry, assets, welfare, and worshiping can be achieved. .. .Disturbing the security of a nation is the biggest sin that could be committed by someone. Of course, if some one is linked to the foreigners will not listen to [this advice] and I am not going to address such groups.

I am going to address the elite. The nation is vigilant, our elite should be vigilant too. The elite should know that any remarks, action, and analysis, which help them (the enemies), will be against the direction the nation is moving. All of us should be very cautious. We should be very cautious. . . There are things that should not be said and uttered. If we speak about them, it means that we have acted against our responsibilities.


The elite are undergoing a test, which is a big one. If we fail in this test, we will not only fall behind for one year, it will also lead to downfall. In order not to have that fate, we should use the yardstick of reason, which invites mankind to worship God.'



The cheeky opposition, in the form of former president Mohammad Khatami, replied by calling for a national referendum on the June 12 presidential elections, which the reformists are convinced were stolen.

Bloomberg speculates that Iran's internal turmoil
may lead Tehran to give less aid to those two groups, weakening them. I don't believe this speculation is correct. First, the hard liners attempt to bolster their prestige by supporting such groups abroad, and they need their prestige more than ever. Second, both are grass roots organizations that can thrive without foreign support. Finally, many Gulf millionaires are waiting in line to donate to causes in both Lebanon and Palestine, so Iran's withdrawal from the fray would just give its rivals an opening. But the funding would still be coming in.

Sometimes officials use the past tense ("the people have . . .") to signal the imperative ("the people had damn well . . .'). I'd read this item translated by the USG Open Source Center that way:

' Military Official Praises Iranians' Obedience To Leader
Fars News Agency
Monday, July 20, 2009

Document Type: OSC Transcribed Text . . .

TEHRAN (FNA)- The Iranian nation's obedience to the Supreme Leader has always thwarted enemies' plots against the Islamic Republic, a senior Iranian military official said Saturday.

"The enemies showed during the recent riots that they aim to overthrow the Islamic ruling system and undermining Vellayat-e-Faqih (religious leadership). People and Basij (volunteer) forces from different walks of life should wisely identify enemies' plots in this regard," Deputy Representative of the Supreme Leader at the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Mojtaba Zonnour [Ar. 'Dhu al-Nur'] said, commenting on recent post-election unrests in Iran.

Zonnour further pointed to the complexity in the nature of post-election unrests, and said the complicated situation ended only after Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei presented insightful guidelines and people staged a wise presence in the scene.

"The enemies' plots were defused through the wise presence of the people and the wise leadership of the Leader. . ."

Further in his remarks, the IRGC official underlined preparedness of the Iranian security forces and police to defend the country, and added that they will remain on the alert to confront any possible soft threat against the country with maximum power.

Earlier in March, IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said that fighting enemies' soft threats is the most important task of the Basij forces.
"Today, the most important and main mission of Basij is confronting enemies' soft threats and cultural invasion which are stealthily targeting the (Iranian) youth," Jafari said.

(Description of Source: Tehran Fars News Agency in English -- Pivately owned online news agency which began operating in mid-November 2002. In December 2007, Hamid Reza Moqaddamfar replaced Mehdi Faza'eli as managing director and told Fars managers that the agency follows "Principle-ists" policies and its activities are in line with the Islamic Republic and the Vali-ye-Faqih; URL: http://www.farsnews.com/)'



More on Sunday's charge by conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi that Akbar Hashemi Refsanjani, undermined the Islamic Republic with his remarks during a Friday prayers sermon last Friday. The USG Open Source Center translates the full Persian article from Fars:

' FYI -- Iranian Cleric Sees Traces of Velvet Revolution in Rafsanjani's Letter
Fars News Agency
Monday, July 20, 2009

Document Type: OSC Summary

Conservative cleric and member of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, once again criticized the head of the Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on 20 July for his comments in his Friday prayer sermons on 17 July and his silence after the 19 June Friday prayer sermons delivered by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i.

Speaking at a meeting with the managing director and high-ranking officials of Fars News Agency in Qom, the head of the Qom Seminary Lecturers Association, Ayatollah Yazdi, said: "There were plans before the election to use the opportunity to carry out a colorful velvet revolution and to oust the system. They (West) believed that the election was a good opportunity to do so, and one of the first sentences that attracted my attention to this issue was the words used by Hashemi in his letter to the leader (prior to the election)."

Yazdi referred to the Friday prayer sermons of 17 July, led by Rafsanjani, and said: "On Thursday (16 July), before Mr Hashemi had spoken, I met with a few colleagues of the Investigation Committee of the Assembly of Experts. I was in charge of the committee and different issues were raised."

Referring to Rafsanjani's sermons, Yazdi said: "We did not expect someone like him to make such comments after all the recommendations we had made to him and after the Leader tried to defend his position like that (in Friday prayer sermons on 19 June). We all know that if Rafsanjani wanted to deliver the Friday prayer sermons right after the election (19 June), he could not have done it and the circumstances were such that he could not have attended Friday prayers."

He added: "As the head of the Expediency Council, Mr Rafsanjani was expected to welcome the remarks of the supreme leader, since His Eminence had defended him and supported him. However, Rafsanjani kept a meaningful silence. I think it was not silence; it was a cry in support of the opposition."

Yazdi said: "This silence became a backbone for the opposition, and others used the silence to carry out some actions which we all witnessed."

The cleric added: "When it came to Mr Hashemi's turn to lead the prayers we were all concerned and expressed our concerns in our last meeting. They (members of the Assembly of Experts) called Rafsanjani and told him that those who care for the system were calling on him to consolidate social unity and protect the system. They told him that his remarks should create unity; but we all saw what he said."
Addressing Rafsanjani, Yazdi said: "As the head of the Expediency Council, do you think this (your remarks) was expedient under current circumstances of the country? It is in the interest of the country to support the leader and the system and to take action against deconstruction. You say the law should be observed and immediately after that you make unlawful remarks and say that the Guardian Council did not use opportunities.

Yazdi then reaffirmed that the election watchdog, the Guardian Council, had never acted partially or supported a specific candidate.

He added: "In any case, Mr Hashemi did not perform well and it is clear to the people that he did not carry out his revolutionary and religious duty at this important juncture. Mr Hashemi should have maintained unity, and called on the opposition to remain calm and put an end to seditions. He should have never allowed foreigners to comment against the country." '

A Fight Over the F-22


The fight over the F-22 is coming to a head this week. President Barack Obama wants to end production of the multibillion-dollar jet fighter, but some powerful Congressional Democrats are standing in the way. Both House and Senate versions of the Defense authorization bill include hundreds of millions of dollars to buy as many as a dozen new jets, provoking a veto threat from Obama.

Visit the Congress.org home page to see stories and documents from around the Web about the jet program.

Saturday, July 18, 2009

Rafsanjani's Steps to Resolve Iran's Crisis

Saturday, July 18, 2009
What was Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani trying to say in his Friday prayers sermon? (The text is below).The reform movement and its allies among pragmatic conservatives have developed a narrative about Khomeinist Iran. They allege that it is ultimately democratic, and that the will of the people is paramount. It is popular sovereignty that authorizes political change and greater political and cultural openness. Precisely because democracy and popular sovereignty are the key values for this movement, the alleged stealing of the June 12 presidential elections by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for his candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is intolerable. A crime has been committed, in their eyes. A social contract has been violated. The will of the people has been thwarted.The hard liners hold a competing and incompatible view of the meaning of Khomeini's 1979 revolution. They discount the element of elections, democracy and popular sovereignty. They view these procedures and institutions as little more than window-dressing. True power and authority lies with the Supreme Leader and ultimately all important decisions are made by him. Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Misbah-Yazdi is an important exponent of this authoritarian view of the Islamic Republic. The Leader in this view is a kind of philosopher-king, who can overrule the people at will. The hard liners do not believe that the election was stolen. But they probably cannot get very excited about the election in the first place. Khamenei and his power and his appointments and his ability to intervene to disqualify candidates, close newspapers, and overrule parliament are what is important. From a hard line point of view, the election is what Khamenei says it is and therefore cannot be stolen.Rafsanjani desired in his sermon to lay a Khomeinist foundation for the more democratic view. He began by underlining his own role in the revolution and the establishment of the Republic, and his position as a witness to the values of Khomeini. He said Khomeini discouraged the anti-Shah activists of the 1960s and 1970s from terrorism. Instead, he urged a direct appeal to the people in their villages and mosques, and responsiveness to their desires. He represents Khomeini as saying, if the people are with us, we have everything.Rafsanjani is saying that the 1978-79 revolution was not Leninist. It was not the work of a small vanguard of activists. It was broad and popular and therefore inevitably, he implies, had something of a democratic character.The authoritarian view of governance in Shiite Islam is anchored by Misbah-Yazdi and his ilk in the theory of the Imamate. Shites believe that the Prophet Muhammad was both temporal ruler and divinely inspired prophet. After him, his relatives also exercised both functions. His son-in-law and first cousin, Ali, is held by Shiites to be the first Imam, the divinely-appointed vicar of the Prophet. But Rafsanjani quotes a Shiite text showing that the Prophet Muhammad said that even Ali could only rule the people with their consent, and without it he should not try. Rafsanjani is reimagining the Imamate not as infallible divine figures succeeding an infallible prophet, but rather as an institution depending on an interaction between God's appointee and the people he is intended to shepherd. Another piece of evidence for the popular character of the Islamic Republic, Rafsanjani says, is Khomeini's own haste to establish lay, elected institutions and to implement a republican constitution. He maintains that Khomeini actually strengthened some of the popular institutions when he made suggestions for revision of the draft constitution. Even having a constitution is a bow to popular sovereignty, he implies, and he contrasts the haste with which revolutionary Iran established a rule of law and popular input into government with the slowness of these processes in countries such as Algeria.Then Rafsanjani says:
' As you are aware, according to the constitution, everything in the country is determined by people's vote. People elect the members of the Assembly of Expert[s] and then they elect leader, that is, the leader is (indirectly) elected by people's vote. Presidents, MPs, members of the councils are elected by direct votes of the people. Other officials are also appointed (indirectly) through people's vote. Everything depends on people. This is the religious system. The title of Islamic Republic is not used as a formality. It includes both the republican and Islamic nature.'
He points out that the parliament, president and members of municipal councils are drectly elected. But the Supreme Leader is indirectly elected, since he is chosen by the Assembly of Experts. But they in turn are directly elected by the people (i.e. the Experts are a sort of electoral college in American terms).Opinion polling shows that Iranians mostly want the Supreme Leader to be directly elected. But Rafsanjani's point is that even the Supreme Leader, whom some see as a theocratic dictator, derives his position from the operation of popular sovereignty.Rafsanjani then speaks of a plague of doubt about the election results that has afflicted a not inconsiderable number of Iranians, including many intellectuals and thinking persons.His solution to this crisis of confidence consists in the following steps:1. All parties to the dispute should act only in accordance with the law.2. The authorities must exert themselves to regain the confidence of the people.3. The door must be left open to free and unrestrained public debate among the contending parties, including on the state-run radio and other media.4. Demonstrators and other prisoners of conscience must be released by the regime.5. The press must be left free to publish a wide range of opinion on these issues.Rafsanjani seems to have been acknowledging that the results of this election are unlikely to be overturned. But he is urging fresh legislation and wide open debate as means of resolving the crisis. So is what Rafsanjani is saying about Khomeini and Khomeinism true? Probably only partially. Khomeini is notorious for having rejected popular sovereignty as a principle. But he did put an elected president and parliament into the constitution, and he surely knew what would follow.

Friday, July 17, 2009

Friday's Sermon Fateful for Iran

Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's sermon at Friday prayers in Tehran on Friday will be closely watched for the signals he sends about the future of Iran. Although he is a strong backer of opposition figure Mir Hosain Mousavi, Rafsanjani has tended to work behind the scenes and to say conciliatory things. As a multi-billionaire, he has no interest in radical change. On the other hand, he clearly feels that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, responsible for nearly 30% inflation and high unemployment, is a disaster for him and persons of his social class. But he would not want angry, massive crowds in the street, since he would be fearful for his own turban. He is likely to be backing Mousavi's plans to build a new political coalition for the next election.
AP points out that even if Rafsanjani makes no political departures, the crowds may be hard to control and that the potential for trouble is there. The most significant thing about the recent political events in Iran may be that the Iranian public has lost its fear of the regime. Iran may do an end-run around US and some NATO countries' foreign policies, by turning to China in a big way. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to be signalling for the first time some willingness to compromise on policy. He just appointed as his vice president a young politician who had gotten into trouble last year for saying that Iran is a friend of the Israeli poeple. The president also appointed a new head of the civilian nuclear enrichment research program, a move unlikely to lack political significance. Anthony Shadid at WaPo raises the question of whether Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has retained more authority than Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, by rejecting clerical rule and supporting instead clerical guidance. On the other hand, Iraq is clearly adopting a realist policy toward the Iranian regime. Some major Iraqi parties, such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, actively support the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad government. Others are reluctant to interfere in domestic Iranian affairs lest the favor be returned. Iraq and Iran just signed two memoranda of understanding on energy issues, so Baghdad is not exactly boycotting Iran over the stolen election or the crackdown on peaceful protesters.

Abdus Salam – Banquet Speech


Abdus Salam's speech at the Nobel Banquet, December 10, 1979
Your Majesties, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of my colleagues, Professor Glashow and Weinberg, I thank the Nobel Foundation and the Royal Academy of Sciences for the great honour and the courtesies extended to us, including the courtesy to me of being addressed in my language Urdu.
Pakistan is deeply indebted to you for this.
The creation of Physics is the shared heritage of all mankind. East and West, North and South have equally participated in it. In the Holy Book of Islam, Allah says
"Thou seest not, in the creation of the All-merciful any imperfection, Return thy gaze, seest thou any fissure. Then Return thy gaze, again and again. Thy gaze, Comes back to thee dazzled, aweary."
This in effect is, the faith of all physicists; the deeper we seek, the more is our wonder excited, the more is the dazzlement for our gaze.
I am saying this, not only to remind those here tonight of this, but also for those in the Third World, who feel they have lost out in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, for lack of opportunity and resource.
Alfred Nobel stipulated that no distinction of race or colour will determine who received of his generosity. On this occasion, let me say this to those, whom God has given His Bounty. Let us strive to provide equal opportunities to all so that they can engage in the creation of Physics and science for the benefit of all mankind. This would exactly be in the spirit of Alfred Nobel and the ideals which permeated his life. Bless You!
From Les Prix Nobel 1979.

http://nobelprize.org/physics/laureates/1979/salam-speech.html

Jesus survived the crucifixion and traveled towards India to continue his ministry


Did Jesus Die on Cross? (English with Urdu subtitles)

What happened to Jesus 2,000 years ago? Amazing Historical Facts regarding Jesus’ surviving crucifixion and migrating to Kashmir. Video Clips from BBC FOUR research documentary.

Pakistani viewers click here


Thursday, July 16, 2009

Religious Orthodoxy and Battle for Rationality

A review of:

Pervez Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and Battle for Rationality

In this book, Dr. Hoodbhoy, a nuclear physicist, eloquently and usefully draws attention to the plight of science and technology in the Muslim world and to the need to do something about it. The book also makes some other helpful insights here and there about why, after centuries of brilliant achievements, science suffered such a fate in the Muslim world. But the book also suffers from some very serious flaws in its view of Islam and analysis of Islamic history.

VILIFICATION OF "RELIGIOUS ORTHODOXY"

To begin with the book shows insufficient appreciation of the fact that rationality and irrationality are almost always found together in every culture or group or individual, from Nobel laureate scientists to man on the street and therefore rationality has to battle within each of them. Failing to do justice to this self-evident fact, the author makes a sharp, almost black-and-white distinction between two tendencies in Islamic history, one irrational and represented by the "religious orthodoxy" and the other rational and represented by philosophers and scientists.

The tone for this outlook is set first in the subtitle of the book and then in the foreword, written by Prof. Abdus Salam, the renowned physicist. The subtitle, "Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality", assumes that religious orthodoxy is a blind force committed against rationality and is something to be battled. We are not told what defines "religious orthodoxy", but it seems that for the author it means religious beliefs and practices taught by the 'ulama' (religious scholars), including those that are also found in the teachings of the Prophet and his companions.

When we move from the title to the foreword, we find Salam condemning the 'ulama' without mercy and without any qualifications. Although this review is about Hoodbhoy'a book, yet because of the stature of Salam as a physicist and the weight that some people might give to his views, it seems worthwhile to examine the foreword in some detail.

Salam divides the 'ulama' into two categories. "First, there are the lay preachers whose major task is to lead prayers in the rural mosques and who earn their living by performing such functions as officiating marriage, death, and circumcision ceremonies and looking after the upkeep of the mosques." With undisguised disdain the Nobel laureate suggests the following way to deal with them: "This is a professional class who should have scant interest in fundamentalist persecution once their livelihood is secured. If this can be guaranteed them … they would not retard the progress of science and technology." What a brilliant solution! Classes that retard progress should be guaranteed livelihood so that other classes may be encouraged to retard progress!

"The second class of 'ulama' is the damaging one. These are men (without spiritual pretensions) who claim to interpret the Holy Qur'an, issue excommunication fatwas … and give their view on all subjects – politics, economics, law – in their Friday sermons. … The arrogance, the rapacity, and the low level of common sense displayed by this class, as well as its tolerance, has been derided by all poets and writers of any consequence in Persia, India, Central Asia, and Turkey." For this second category of 'ulama, Salam suggests no brilliant solutions. Apparently, their case is hopeless.

Salam makes takfir (which he translates as excommunication and means declaring someone a non-believer or outside the fold of Islam) as the starting point of his analysis of what is wrong with the Muslim world and what to do about the promotion of science and technology there. Like the 'ulama', he condemns takfir without any qualifications. "What is the remedy that takfir does not recur"? Takfir is viewed here as bad without any exceptions. Yet is this position rational? Does not a group, whether religious or secular have the right to define itself? Can we not form a group by setting a basis in belief and practice for membership. And can we then not expel those members who have radically departed from that basis? A negative answer to these questions is the presupposition of Salam's comments, which is clearly irrational. Indeed, takfir is not too different from Salam's decision not to write a foreword for Hoodboy's book (p. ix) if it did not agree with his views. Nobody can object to the condition that Salam imposed for writing the foreword. Similarly, no body can object to the right of a group to impose certain conditions for membership in it.

The disgust with which Salam treats a whole class of people and his categorical and unqualified rejection of the very idea of takfir is not understandable on any rational grounds. But it begins to make sense once we keep in mind that Salam belongs to the Qadiyani sect which is one of the very few sects, if not the only one, that Muslims have, with a level of unanimity rarely achieved in Islamic history, declared outside the fold of Islam. This makes him lose sight of two very obvious facts: 1) groups do have the right to decide what they stand for and insist that people either subscribe to their foundational principles or leave; and 2) a whole class of people cannot be so uniformly disgusting as Salam makes the 'ulama' to be.

The vilification of the 'ulama' started in the foreword by Salam is continued in the book by Hoodbhoy, although while Salam demonizes the 'ulama because they declared the Qadiyani sect to be outside the fold of Islam, Hoodbhoy's motivation comes from a negative attitude towards religion itself.

Hoodboy presents as "heroes" (p. 107) some Muslim scientists and philosophers who supposedly held very unconventional views about Islam such as al-Kindi, al-Razi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Khaldun while he turns other brilliant leaders and thinkers such as 'Umar bin al-Khattab and al-Ghazali into villains. This strict division between villains and heroes, as is often the case, proves to be mistaken under scrutiny. Thus one "orthodox villain" Ibn Taymiyyah considered another "orthodox villain" al-Ghazali as misguided. Similarly, Ibn Khaldun, one of Hoodbhoy's heroes, condemns another of his heroes Ibn Sina as anti-religious. Furthermore, if "villains" like al-Ghazali seem to discourage the study of some sciences, then so do "heroes" like Ibn Khaldun who opposed the science of chemistry and Ibn Rushd who said: "books written by scholars should be forbidden to the ordinary person by the rulers."

Likewise, there is no clear demarcation between the persecutors and the persecuted on the basis of ideology. Both the "orthodox" and the "rationalists" could be persecuted or be the persecutors if circumstances so conspired. Thus Hoodbhoy's villains suffered some hardships as did his heroes. The rationalists Mu'tazilites were in power when the "orthodox" Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and others were tortured for their views on the nature of the Qur'an and eventually killed. Later, the "orthodox" were in power and they seized one Abd al-Sallam in whose house were found books on philosophy, witchcraft, astrology, cults of the stars, and prayers addressed to the planets. At least the orthodox did not physically torture him, much less kill him. They simply burnt the books in his possession and cursed in public those who wrote them or believed in them. What is most interesting is that Imam Ibn Hanbal was also cursed because Abd al-Sallam was his grandson and was regarded as one of his disciples. That Ahmad ibn Hanbal could be considered a teacher of a philosopher with books on witchcraft and worship of the stars and then could be cursed by the "orthodox" shows how blurred were the distinctions between the "orthodox" and the "rationalist heretics". Also, without doubt many of Hoodbhoy's heroic philosophers and scientists would have agreed with their "villainous orthodox" counterparts in rejecting astrology, witchcraft, worship of stars and planets.

But Hoodbhoy's book has to sharpen the distinction between the "orthodox" and the "rationalists" to the point of making it black and white. Having no original approach in his analysis of Islamic history, he simply sees it in terms of the conflict in Western history between the Chruch and science and between the Chruch and the state. Since in Islam there is no central organized authority comparable to the Church establishment, something like the "religious orthodoxy" had to be given the place of the church in order to force the model of Christian history on to the Islamic history. Likewise, since over against this "religious orthodoxy" there were no scientists in clear opposition, he has to pick some Muslim philosophers and scientists as heroes comparable to Galileo and other European scientists. And since the diagnosis of the problem is imported from the West, then the solution also comes from there. As we shall see, the solution according to the author is secularism, separation of religion and state.

In order to paint a negative image of the "religious orthodoxy" Hoodbhoy lists a number of incidents that supposedly establish such an image (p. 95-107). We have already referred to one such incident, that involving Abd al-Sallam. As we have seen this incident only points to the difficulty of sharply distinguishing the orthodox from other Muslims. Another incident mentioned is about "the orthodox sultan, Khawarism Shah." When a word was brought to him of a land of the midnight sun, the sultan regarded the report as pure heresy, for if such information were accurate it would put into question the prayer times. Later, the sultan accepted the report when the well-known Muslim scientist, Al-Biruni, who then lived at the court of the sultan, assured him of its accuracy. Now, we may ask: where, in this story, is that blind force of irrationality that the orthodox are supposed as a rule to manifest and which rationality has to battle? We can accuse the sultan of limited intelligence or of rushing to judgment -- by no means rare human qualities in any time, place, and group -- but there is no blind opposition to rationality here. The sultan keeps company with the likes of al-Biruni and when the great man of learning explains the matter to him, he listens to reason.

AN UNFOUNDED ACCUSATION AGAINST 'UMAR THE GREAT

Another example of the blindness of the religious orthodoxy is a tradition about 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, one of the towering figures of human history. Hoodbhoy taints the name of 'Umar by quoting the tradition that when Muslims conquered Persia their commander Sa'd bin Abi Waqqas came across a very large number of books. He asked 'Umar what to do about these books and received the reply: "Throw them in the water. If what they contain is right guidance, God has given us better guidance. If it is error, God has protected us against it." The tradition is quoted as part of the examples on p. 95-107 of the blindness of the "religious orthodoxy".

Hoodbhoy clearly does not know that this tradition is a total fabrication and that it is known as such to scholars, both Muslims and non-Muslims. The story is first mentioned by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), that is, seven centuries after the time of 'Umar. We have an earlier story, but this one is not about throwing in the water a large number of books in Iran but burning by fire a similarly large number in Alexandria, Egypt. The earliest mention of this Alexandrian version of the story is also late, about six centuries after the time of 'Umar. During these six centuries voluminous books of history were written not only by Muslims but also by Christians and Jews. Yet not a hint of burning of any library in any land conquered under 'Umar is found in any of these books, not even those written by Ibn Khaldun, who mentions it in his sociological work, al-Muqaddimah. Moreover, there is evidence that the Alexandrian library was destroyed earlier by Christians before Islam and in the time of 'Umar there was no library in the Egyptian city to burn! The legendary character of the story is so obvious that any writer who has some academic standing and has examined the story from a historical point of view has rejected it, including Gibbon, Butler, Victor Chauvin, Paul Casanova, Eugenio Griffini, Carlyle, Hector, Renan, Sedillot, Devanport, Gustav Lebon, Will Durant, Bernard Lewis, Shibli Nu'mani, and the Iranian scholar Murtada Mutahhari. Had Hoodbhoy examined the reliability of this report in anything like a scientific spirit, he would have quickly discovered the above mentioned facts and reached the obvious conclusion that the story has no basis in historical fact.

SUPERFICIAL CRITIQUE OF IMAM AL-GHAZALI

If Hoodbhoy never suspected anything wrong in a report casting aspersion on a person like 'Umar, although even a Christian writer in the 17th century wrote that the report does not ring true (Eusèbe Renaudot, History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria), then it is only to be expected that Hoodbhoy would jump on any words of lesser representatives of the "religious orthodoxy" if they would paint them as blind. For this crime of religious orthodoxy, Hoodbhoy singles out al-Ghazali as the worst culprit. In doing so he uses English translation of the German translation by Goldziher of the Arabic works, and possibly also that Orientalist's analysis. It is well known that Goldziher at times misunderstood Arabic texts he used. A well known example is a text by al-Zuhri which Goldziher misinterpreted to mean that al-Zuhri admitted fabricating hadith in order to please the rulers.

More importantly, Hoodbhoy quotes only the passages where al-Ghazali seems to discourage the study of science and philosophy. Violating basic principle of rational scientific inquiry, he completely ignores a large number of other statements by al-Ghazali that point in the other direction, e.g.

1) Al-Ghazali rejected conformism or uncritical acceptance of any set of ideas including that of the Shari'ah. He went through an agonizing ordeal in search of truth. He critically examined the positions of both the religious and philosophical groups existing in his time. As he himself says: "In the bloom of my life, from the time I reached puberty before I was twenty until now, when I am over fifty, I have constantly been diving daringly into the depth of this profound sea and wading into its deep water like a bold man, not like a cautious coward. I would penetrate far into every mazy difficulty."

2) Al-Ghazali in his Munqidh condemns those who rejected scientific propositions of the philosophers even when those propositions were true, simply because some of their other philosophical conclusions conflicted with religion.

3) In his famous book, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din, he divides knowledge into 'ulum shar'iyyah (sciences of the Shari'ah) and 'ulum ghayr shar'iyyah (non-Shari'ah sciences). To the latter belongs mathematics and medicine, which he describes as praiseworthy sciences. They are considered fard kifayah, that is, it is a collective obligation of the Muslims to train enough members of the community with expertise in these fields so that the needs of the Islamic society are fulfilled. This implies that every Muslim would be committing a sin if there was a shortage of experts in these sciences. To be sure, in the same book, al-Ghazali also criticized unnecessary studies in mathematics that do not have practical applications. But clearly we have to understand the two positions in the light of each other. It should also be noted that al-Ghazali had a similar criticism for sciences of Shariah. Thus he blamed the students of jurisprudence for their indulgence in minute details of the Shari'ah. The context indicates that according to al-Ghazali it would be better to study medicine instead of specializing in issues in jurisprudence that might never prove to be of any benefit. In a later book, al-Mustasfa min 'Ilm al-Usul, al-Ghazali seems to be much more negative towards mathematical fields (arithmetic and geometry). But this is probably a case of an author going too far in expressing one concern – in this case a concern to warn against certain false teachings of the philosophers – at the expense of other concerns.

4) Al-Ghazali's criticism of the philosophers is not a criticism of rationality, for he himself uses the rational method in the criticism. He wrote two books to refute the philosophers: Maqasid al-Falasifah (The Aims of the Philosophers) and Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). In the first book he objectively set down what Muslim philosophers were saying in his time. As he himself says: "I thought that I should introduce, prior to the Tahafut, a concise account that will include the story of their aims (maqasid) which will be derived from their logical, natural and metaphysical sciences, without distinguishing between what is right and what is wrong, without additions and along with what they believed as their proofs." (Maqasid, p. 31) This conscious attempt to present an objective account of the thought of adversaries is more rational than Hoodbhoy's biased and selective representation of al-Ghazali's thought. It was followed by the Tahafut, which subject the views of the philosophers to logical criticism within a set of shared assumptions.

5) Al-Ghazali is aware that there are more sciences within reach of human beings than existed in his time. "It appeared to me through clear insight and beyond doubt, that man is capable of acquiring several sciences that are still latent and not existent" (Jawahir al-Qur'an).

Al-Ghazali gives reasons why certain type of pursuit of some sciences may not be desirable. These reasons are: a) what is true in some sciences may lead one to accept what is false in those or other related sciences; b) some sciences have no use; and c) pursuit of science is wrong if it is motivated by wrong intentions such as "attaining worldly ends, securing its vanities, acquiring its dignities, surpassing your contemporaries".

Al-Ghazali's views here, although not entirely unjustifiable are clearly in error. But we must keep in mind that science is not defined by its conclusions but by its methodology. There has never been a scientist who did not hold fundamentally erroneous ideas. Consequently, if we required that a thinker should hold only valid ideas before we can put him on the side of rationality and science, then no human will fit the bill. One can even be critical of science and rationality and yet be completely scientific and rational. It is also true that a person can make excellent contributions to a very specific area of science and yet may be very irrational and unscientific in his views generally. The way al-Ghazali debates the issues qualifies him as a rational and scientific man. He was certainly wrong in considering certain sciences useless, but it is possible to argue with him with evidence to the contrary and to change his opinion. He was also wrong in his estimation of the spiritual dangers of pursuing studies of some fields, but again it is possible to argue with him otherwise and change his positions. The tragedy for Muslims has not been that there arose men like al-Ghazali in the Muslim world but that 'ulama in general did not continue to argue like them, so that when abundant evidence piled up in favor of the tremendous usefulness and even indispensability of many areas of science they did not encourage Muslims to pursue them as fard kifayah.

It is also interesting that one of the recent Islamic philosopher and thinker, Allamah Muhammad Iqbal has also frequently made negative statements about intellectual knowledge ('ilm) which he contrasts with seeing (nazr) and about reason ('aql) which he contrasts with heart (Urdu: dil). He has said that modern education brings with it disbelief (ilhad). Yet no reader of Iqbal thinks that he was against a vigorous pursuit of intellectual knowledge and the sciences. Al-Ghazali's negative statements about philosophy, mathematics etc can probably be evaluated similarly.

Hoodbhoy does not at all mention Iqbal in his book. This omission at first sight seems surprising, considering that Iqbal is such an influential thinker, especially in Pakistan, a country to which Hoodbhoy pays special attention. But the omission is quite understandable: Because of Iqbal's status, not only among the general public but also among the very educated people, Hoodbhoy could not present him as a villain, and yet Iqbal says all the things that the author's villains say. Any treatment of Iqbal would have exposed the artificiality of our author's sharp distinction, in terms of darkness and light, between orthodoxy and philosophy/science.

Al-Ghazali's Views on Cause-Effect Relation and Free Will

One reason al-Ghazali is put squarely against rationality is Hoodbhoy's understanding of the term. Following Nietzshe, Hoodbhoy defines "rationality" as "a matrix of connections which assigns cause to effect". In this form, the definition can hardly exclude any one from rationality, since almost every human being, from the primitive man living in jungles to the most sophisticated researcher, in some way accepts the validity of cause and effect relationship. Even animals must at some level have a notion of this relationship, for otherwise they could not function as living organisms. The difference lies in the degree to which the relationship is viewed as deterministic or necessary. Hoodbhoy often seems to assume -- and make part of rationality -- a strictly deterministic connection, that is, every event (with the possible exception of the big bang?) can be assigned a set of causes that uniquely determine that event. The problem with this view of rationality is that it has identified rationality with a particular position on the cause-effect relationship. A satisfactory definition of rationality, however, should leave room for questioning all positions including a position on the cause-effect relationship. The irreducible minimum of such a definition should consist only of: a) a belief in the general intelligibility of the universal order, b) some rules of logic, and c) use of observations and experiments in validating all models of the universe.

If one must connect rationality and the acceptance of a cause and effect relation, the connection should be expressed in probabilistic terms. One could, for example, say: Rationality assigns probabilities to possible effects resulting from a given set of causes, consistent with whatever observations we do possess and whatever analysis of those observations we are able to conduct. We become irrational when we assign probabilities (including 0 and 1) to effects without regard to available observations.

To get back to our author, Hoodbhoy condemns al-Ghazali for denying that the cause-effect relationship is sufficient for explaining events in the universe and for accepting the belief in predestination. What Hoodbhoy fails to realize is that even if these positions are wrong, they are not irrational or against science, since logic and science cannot prove them false. Al-Ghazali said that "the conjunction (al-'iqtiran) between what is conceived by way of habit (fi al-'adah) as cause and effect is not necessary (laysa daruriyyan)." Many centuries later the philosopher David Hume will argue a similar position. This position can also be justifiably derived from modern quantum physics, which admits the possibility that a given state of the universe may lead in any future moment of time one of several possible states. If so, then just as al-Ghazali said, cause-effect relationship is not necessary.

As for al-Ghazali's belief in predestination, it can be justified by the assumption, perfectly reasonable, that human thoughts and actions are events in the universe and are subject to laws according to which the universe functions. This leads to two possibilities.

First, we may assume a deterministic universe in the sense that there are laws, discoverable through science, according to which one state of the universe completely determines all future states. In particular, all human activities are completely predetermined by the past states of the universe. There is nothing inherently irrational about such a deterministic view of the universe. Indeed, it is a reasonable deduction from the cause-effect relationship, so important for Hoodbhoy, and has often been assumed by philosophers and scientists, especially in the 18th and 19th century. Buoyed by the initial successes of science to explain the data available at the time, some scientists believed that everything that happens in the universe, including human feelings, thoughts, choices, and actions can be explained, at least in theory, in terms of the motions of various particles in the human body and elsewhere in the universe and therefore can be predicted, at least in theory, using some boundary conditions and the mathematical equations of physics. There is no real difference between this view and the belief in predestination, except that the term "predestination" suggests that human actions are predetermined not by some boundary conditions and mathematical laws but by some intelligent agent or God.

Second, we may assume a non-deterministic universe of the type described by quantum physics. In this case, we can reasonably argue that while a given state is not completely determined by the past states according to the laws discoverable by science, it is nevertheless uniquely determined in the sense that "it will be what it will be, and could not be anything else". This is again equivalent to predestination.

Hoodbhoy again and again stresses the importance of belief in the freedom of will and in a strict cause-effect relationship. But there is a contradiction between the two beliefs. For, if a free exercise of human will is an event within the observable universe, it cannot be assigned a sufficient cause, for otherwise it cannot be "free" in any reasonable sense. On the other hand, if free will operates somewhere outside the observable universe, then the actions resulting from this operation of will, which clearly take place within the observable universe, cannot be assigned a sufficient cause within that universe. In either case the belief in freedom of will implies that there are events in the observable universe that cannot be assigned sufficient causes within that universe, that is, we cannot at the same time affirm belief in the freedom of will and belief in a strict cause-effect relationship governing the observable universe.

In the light of above comments, one can conclude that Hoodbhoy's pronouncements against al-Ghazali are somewhat superficial, since they do not proceed from a proper study of al-Ghazali and of the philosophical and scientific issues connected with predestination, free will, and cause-effect relationship.

RELIGION'S SIDE NOT TREATED ADEQUATELY

One would expect that a book on "Islam and Science" will treat the subject from both sides -- from the side of science and from the side of Islam. This means that the book should explain, on the one hand, what science is and what it aims to achieve and, on the other hand, explain what Islam is and what it aims to achieve. It should then discuss how far and in what ways the aims of the two can be achieved simultaneously. But while Hoodbhoy does explain the nature and aims of science, he provides no such treatment of Islam. He is content to make a few general statements, e.g., religion and science have different domains and therefore neither invalidates the other; neglect of science and technology by Muslims and their other failings do not prove or disprove Islam's truth (p. 139); and a rather profound observation that religion "is a reasoned and reasonable abdication of reason with regard to those questions which lie outside the reach of science" (p. 137). Had he explored these ideas in some detail he could have done some justice to the topic from the side of religion.

FUNDUMENTALIST SECULARIST-HUMANIST

Any writer's interpretations of past or present events are cly connected with his world-view and other assumptions that he has accepted in his mind. In trying to evaluate this particular book, I therefore enquired about the world-view that lies behind Hoodbhoy's analysis.

While reading the book, I got the impression that the author is reluctant to deal with "Islam and Science" from the point of view of Islam not only because he might not have sufficient knowledge and understanding of Islam but also because for that very reason he does not have a really positive view of religion. A few positive statements about Islam that he does make seem to be a concession to the reality that Islam is a fact of life in the Muslim world. This impression was confirmed when I came across the author's article on "Muslims and the West after September 11" (downloaded from the Internet on July 1, 2002). In that article he states:

"Our collective survival lies in recognizing that religion is not the solution; neither is nationalism. Both are divisive, embedding within us false notions of superiority and arrogant pride that are difficult to erase. We have but one choice: the path of secular humanism, based upon the principles of logic and reason. This alone offers the hope of providing everybody on this globe with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

The author formulates here in clear terms a position that was probably present in his mind in some form when he wrote the book under review, about a decade earlier (in 1991).

In the article he also repeats his attack against "religious orthodoxy" becoming somewhat harsher:

"Science flourished in the Golden Age of Islam because there was within Islam a strong rationalist tradition, carried on by a group of Muslim thinkers known as the Mutazilites. This tradition stressed human free will, strongly opposing the predestinarians who taught that everything was foreordained and that humans have no option but to surrender everything to Allah. While the Mutazilites held political power, knowledge grew. But in the twelfth century Muslim orthodoxy reawakened, spearheaded by the cleric Imam Al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali championed revelation over reason, predestination over free will. He refuted the possibility of relating cause to effect, teaching that man cannot know or predict what will happen; God alone can. He damned mathematics as against Islam, an intoxicant of the mind that weakened faith." (Hoodbhoy, "Muslims and the West after September 11").

Clearly, Hoodbhoy has not learnt very much over the past ten years, since his criticism of al-Ghazali and religious orthodoxy reflects the same lack of understanding of the writings of al-Ghazali and the complexity of the issues connected with predestination, free will, and cause-effect relationship that he manifested in his book.

As for the secularist position, Hoodbhoy seems to assert it on the strength of its present popularity and dominance rather than on the basis of any rational analysis. We find only the following sweeping generalizations:

"Islam -- like Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, or any other religion -- is not about peace. Nor is it about war. Every religion is about absolute belief in its own superiority and its divine right to impose itself upon others. In medieval times, both the Crusades and the Jihads were soaked in blood. Today, Christian fundamentalists attack abortion clinics in the US and kill doctors; Muslim fundamentalists wage their sectarian wars against each other; Jewish settlers holding the Old Testament in one hand and Uzis in the other burn olive orchards and drive Palestinians off their ancestral land; Hindus in India demolish ancient mosques and burn down churches; Sri Lankan Buddhists slaughter Tamil separatists"

Here the author fails to notice that his criticism of religions applies to his own secularist position. Notice the absolutist statements: "we have but one choice: the path of secular humanism …"; "this alone offers the hope …". There is here the same "absolute belief" in the "superiority" of secular humanism that religions are criticized for. The author seems unable to admit the possibility that religion might be able to provide a better alternative to secular humanism. As for the list of the bloody battles in which followers of various religions have been involved, certainly secularism has not prevented people from similarly bloody wars. Hoodbhoy would have to claim that this is because the existing secularist countries like the USA and UK ceaselessly wage war because they are nationalistic and not sufficiently secularist-humanist and that if we can have a perfect humanist secular society, it will not engage in bloody wars. Well, many religious groups also claim that if a true form of their religion was in practice somewhere they will not do some of the wrong things that they now do.

There is no substantial difference between the mentality Hoodbhoy manifests and those of the religious people whom he criticizes. He has simply replaced religion with his favored ideology. It seems fair to say that Hoodbhoy has become or is in the process of becoming a fundamentalist secularist-humanist.

IN CONCLUSION, Hoodbhoy's perspective on "Islam and Science" comes from a lost faith and from a somewhat immature rationality. For this reason he cannot see what some other thinkers such as Allamah Iqbal could see: Secular humanism or any other similar set of ideas is not the "only way". Islamic civilization, after its present ruin, will once again vibrate with life as an authentically Islamic civilization, not only overcoming some of its deep problems but also guiding humanity to a vastly better alternative to the existing world order.

Some Views on This Review

(June 2005)

I) Dr. Hoodbhoy has posted the above review on the web (www.mukto-mona.com/Articles/hoodbhoy/book_review_islam_science.htm). I appreciate this but I cannot help observing that Dr. Hoodbhoy seems to be incurably attached to the idea of dividing Muslims into orthodox and some other category. He describes me and my review as follows:

"THIS IS ONE OF THE MOST DETAILED CRITIQUES OF MY BOOK. PERHAPS THE MOST ARTICULATE ONE YET BY AN ORTHODOX BELIEVER."

Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy

19/04/2005

Hoodbhoy also calls my review "a view from the other side of the divide".

I personally do not mind the description "orthodox", but most Muslims probably would not agree with it, since I believe that about half of the ahadith in Bukhari and Muslim are unreliable and the Qur'an is a creation of God. This only further supports the point I made in my review, namely, that dividing Muslims into orthodox and non-orthodox is a gross oversimplification.

II) Another writer "fatemolla" makes some detailed comments on my review (Comments on: - A review of: Pervez Hoodbhoy's 'Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality' - By: Dr. Ahmad Shafaat, Advocate, High Court of Pakistan. Published on May 11, 2005, www.mukto-mona.com/Articles/fatemolla/hoodbhoy_shafaat.htm).

He begins his comments with the admission:

"Although I am yet to read Dr. Hoodbhoy's book and cannot relate it to Dr. Ahmad Shafaat's review of it, I am taking the opportunity to comment on some general aspects of the review."

Taking up pen to write about a book's review without even reading the book is very likely to lead to some serious mistakes. Such is indeed the case with "fatemolla's" article, which is full of comments that have little connection with issues I am discussing or my views about those issues. The carelessness with which "fatemolla" has written his article can be illustrated by the fact that he describes me as "advocate, high court of Pakistan", despite the fact that I have never been a lawyer or an advocate of any kind in Pakistan or anywhere else. I have all my life been only a student of Islam, Christianity, Science, Mathematics, and Decision Sciences!!!